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This paper embarks on the challenge of deriving the value of internet startups. They are 
difficult to value due to their obsession with acquiring users at the expense of revenues. My 
argument is that the key to resolve some of the high level of uncertainty surrounding these 
startups is to analyze if the startup can generate sufficient revenues from the userbase and 
how. Two-sided markets theory describes how platforms brings together two groups of 
customers which are interdependent and how a platform intermediator can profit from 
bringing them together. A common setup is to bring together users and advertisers to an 
internet service and profit from selling advertisement. However, a platform can be creative in 
selecting group of customers to bring together and is not limited to advertisers. By asking the 
research question “how can two-sided markets theory be incorporated to valuation of internet 
startups?” the paper takes a two-sided markets approach to exploring how to identify revenue 
opportunities embedded in many internet startups and how to derive a value from it. 
 
The question is answered through a theoretical approach that draws on previous research on 
two-sided markets relevant to forecasting future revenue opportunities. The relevant parts of 
the theory are then used to construct an analytical framework that can be used to identify 
revenue opportunities of a startup. Lastly, I illustrate how the framework can be used in a 
valuation setting. 
 
The findings contribute to the two-sided markets theory by showing that the theory is relevant 
to a broader range of internet firms than the social network and sharing economy firms 
covered in previous studies. Furthermore, the framework constructed and demonstrated in this 
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PART I - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Internet startups are young firms with a disruptive idea on how to create more value to 
customers through their software over the internet. Google changed the way we find 
information, Uber changed the way we get from A to B, AirBnB offered a new way of travel, 
and the list goes on. With their incredibly scalable technology they are able to achieve growth 
rates far greater than other distribution models, which appeals to investors seeking high 
returns. However, the extensive use of growth at any price strategy employed by many 
internet ventures makes it exceptionally hard to apply traditional valuation methods.  
 
In 2000 the market learned this the hard way when the Dot-com bubble revealed that internet 
firms was highly overvalued. Investors had to take big losses and it significantly affected the 
real economy.  
 
New business models where they focus on growing and outright ignore making money results 
in an extra layer of complexity and significant uncertainty for an analyst trying to determine 
the value of such internet ventures. For these businesses it is all about growth through user 
acquisition, which in many cases entails offering free services and collecting revenue in a 
later stage. Not until they have a large enough user base, will they start to concern themselves 
with a revenue model that is profitable. The million -sometimes billion-dollar- question in a 
becomes; will they ever be able to acquire enough users and will they be able profit from 
them? Forecasting the future of internet ventures almost become like telling a fairytale, it 
requires a whole lot of fantasy. To academics’ frustration with fantasy, they argue that option 
pricing theory is the better solution to valuation under high level of uncertainty.  
 
Two-sided markets theory explains the logic behind pursuing growth in number of users and 
delay revenue as taking advantage of the existence of network effects in internet markets. 
Network effects in markets tend to create a winner-take-all environment with increasing 
returns, and so a race to become the largest player on the field makes perfect sense. All 
though growing a two-sided market is a “chicken and the egg” problem according to the 
literature in terms of which side to grow first, the majority of startups seems to focus on 
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acquiring none-paying users first and connect them with another group later that are 
profitable. Just like Facebook made a free social media platform for consumers and later 
connected it with an advertising market. In retrospect Facebook worked out quite well, but the 
reality is that it is hard to predict success on the internet as most internet firms do not survive. 
Perhaps  
 
Risk-averse investors of course dislike uncertainty. If they are faced with two investments 
with equal return but different certainty, they will go with the more certain one. Unless the 
discount for the riskier cash flow is large enough to off-set the risk. The discount is central to 
investors’ decision-making on allocating capital. Valuation methods have different ways of 
doing this, thus it is important to choose the right tool for the right job.  
   
While past research has done great progress on sharpening the existing valuation tools for 
more reliable estimates on internet startups, it seems to have overlooked the value of two-
sided markets theory as a framework for analysis purposes. This paper is an endeavor to 
contribute to the challenge of valuating internet startups with the help of two-sided markets. 
 
1.2 Problem Outline 
While practitioners have sworn to the Discounted Cash Flow method (DCF) for its ease of 
use, scholars argue that Real Option Valuation (ROV) methods are well suited for dealing 
with uncertainty (Damodaran, 2005; Douglas, 2007; MacMillian, 2004; McGrath, 1997). One  
study learned that managers who had tried ROV for a year said that options embedded in 
managerial flexibility is too complex and cannot be narrowed down to 5-6 variables which is 
the case for option pricing (Blenko et al., 2010).  
 
An increasing gap between firms’ book value and market value, referred to as the Information 
Age, has led academics to explore the hidden value not found on the balance sheet (Petty & 
Guthrie, 2000). This is especially true for Internet firms who have very little tangible assets 
on their balance sheet. A study done by Lev (2001) revealed that 80% of the market value of 
firms listed on S&P 500 between 1977-2001 was not reflected in the balance sheet. These 
values are Intangible Assets and can consist of things like brand value and intellectual 
knowledge. Although intangible assets account for a significant portion of total firm market 
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value, a good argument has been made to debunk valuation methods focusing on intangibles. 
Stephen Penman (2009) argues that intangibles are so complex and interconnected, it is 
impossible to include it in a financial statement without creating more uncertainty. However, 
he says, intangibles may not be included on the balance sheet but will, if they indeed have 
value, be present in the income statement. A DCF and other valuation methods that 
incorporates cash flows should therefor account for the value of intangibles.     
 
This leads us back to the more traditional valuation methods. Research on how ROV can be 
used on High-tech firms has primarily focused on technology with a highly uncertain 
development stage. If the development stage is successful the technology can be patented, 
followed by a commercialization stage. If the firm succeed in the commercialization, they can 
start monetizing on their state-of-the-art technology. This is typical for pharmaceutical, 
semiconductor, hardware and some software firms. However, this is usually not the case for 
Internet firms that develop state-of-the-art software services. Internet startups belongs within 
the High-tech sector (Aramand, 2008; Cusumano, 2008), but they are also significantly 
different from their peers in regards to characteristics that are crucial to valuation.  
 
Internet startups often do not have a clearly sequenced life cycle. Ironically, the software 
development itself is relatively trivial because it consists of, and is limited by, pre-existing 
technology (Aramand, 2008). Semiconductor firms, and also drug companies, usually file 
patents on their innovations to make it hard for competitors to tap into the specific market 
after a successful development. This is often useless for Internet startups because competitors 
can easily replicate a software by writing a different code. Take Dropbox for instance, a cloud 
storage service that lets user store files in the cloud in a convenient way and access them 
easily from different devices. The software code needed to do this was state-of-the-art 
according to Aramand’s (2008) definition of High-tech, but was been replicated by firms like 
Apple, Microsoft, Box and several more. It illustrates how easy it is for competitors and 
newcomers to replicate a software. The technology that Internet firms develop to create value 
to their customers, despite being high-tech, is not as vital to success as in the case of its high-
tech peers. 
 
What is crucial and separates the winning internet ventures from the losers is whether they 
can overcome the distorted market signals confusion (Porter, 2001). Heavy subsidized prices 
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and sometimes free products and services employed to attract customers leads to artificially 
high demand. This causes the absence of revenue which eventually needs to be solved by the 
firms in order to succeed.  
 
In line with Porter’s (2001) distorted market signal confusion argument, this thesis contends 
that uncertainty around internet ventures is not resolved by successful development and 
commercialization of a technology. It is when a firm succeed in figuring out how to 
generating revenues large enough to turn profits. My argument also aligns well with Clayton 
Christensen (2003) who said that “it is not the technology per se but how it is being used that 
creates and sustain revenue”.  
 
The intense focus on high-growth strategy makes sense from a network effects theory 
perspective because it is the key to market power and increasing returns in many internet 
markets (Alstyne et al., 2016). McIntyre and Chintakananda (2013) have addressed the 
importance of network effects during a product release in a valuation setting. They developed 
a growth option method where the level of network effects increases the growth option value. 
The method does not solve the market distortion signal confusion however.  
 
To address this gap, I will draw on the two-sided market theory. Two-sided markets theory 
address network effects but can also help us identify the growth options that are profitable. 
Two-sided markets theory provides us with a framework to focus on the options embedded in 
internet startups, to add or replace agent groups (customers and suppliers) to the market 





1.3 Problem Statement 
As stated in the problem outline, this thesis argues that often it is not the technology or the 
potential to grow that makes internet ventures risky, it is the uncertainty surrounding whether 
they are able to turn it into revenue. Furthermore, the literature has overlooked the potential of 
two-sided markets theory as a framework to address this uncertainty in a valuation setting. It 
follows that the focus of this paper will be on two-sided markets theory and valuation of 
internet startups. The research question is: 
 
How can two-sided markets theory be incorporated to valuation of internet 
startups?  
 
In order to answer the research question, three sub-questions will be addressed in the 
endeavor: 
 
1 Is two-sided markets theory relevant to the majority of internet startups or just a few?  
 
By answering the first t sub-question we are able to first establish the relevance of two-sided 
markets theory.  
 
2 How relevant is two-sided markets theory for valuation purposes? 
 
3 What are the advantages and limitations of a two-sided markets approach compared to 
real option valuation?” 
 




1.4 Research Design 
The study takes on a deductive approach, where prior knowledge about internet startups from 
both theory and empirical work is used to locate identify gaps in the valuation research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). I then use on two-sided markets theory to address the gap. In order to 
incorporate the theory into valuation, I will draw on two common methodical frameworks 
within valuation theory. Due to the high level of uncertainty surrounding startups, 
probabilistic methods should be used (Abrams, 2010), which both of the chosen methods are.   
 
Real Option Valuation will be used as it is favored by scholars in valuation of highly 
uncertain assets. First Chicago Method is the second method that will be used. First Chicago 
Method (FCM) is a modified version of DCF that incorporates multiple scenarios with the 
possibility to assign a probability to each scenario, suitable for startups where the future is 
highly uncertain (Abrams, 2010).   
The reason for choosing First Chicago Method is because it is widely used by venture 
capitalists (2010) and it is similar to a textbook discounted cash flow method but has some 
favorable modifications with respect to uncertainty. 
 
The research question is divided into three sub-questions listed in the Problem Statement 
section. They are structured in such a way that by answering the first question, I am able to 
establish whether the two-sided markets theory is relevant for the majority of internet startups 
or only a few. This will reveal whether the conclusion of this paper can be generalized to a 
broad specter of internet startups. The second sub-question answer most of the main research 
question and third sub-question allow us to reflect on how a two-sided markets approach 
compare to using a well-established ROV.  
 
Some limitations need to be put in place to make the study feasible. The firms of interest are 
limited to startups even though this gap in the research apply to mature private and public 
firms as well. The ideal research design for this study might be a combination between what 
is being deployed and a case study. The case study would allow the study to fully demonstrate 
how the two-sided market framework can be combined with the two valuation methods. 
However, gaining access to sufficient financial information on internet startups is difficult due 




PART II - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.2 Internet Startups 
For convenience, we start with a definition of an internet firm. Rothaermel et al. define 
Internet firms as “pure Internet concerns that either compete in the business-to-consumer 
and/or business-to-business market to conduct e-commerce”. E-commerce is then defined as 
“any economic transaction where the buyer and seller come together through the electronic 
media of the Internet, form a contractual agreement concerning the pricing and delivery of 
particular goods or services, and complete the transaction through the delivery of payments 
and goods or services as contracted”. Note that the definition excludes firms that are part 




In order to survive firms must adapt to its surroundings, and so the environment defines much 
of the characteristics of firms operating within it. We will start by looking at the environment 
that shapes how Internet startups operate. 
 
The internet economy is a demand-side driven economies of scale environment, meaning that 
network effects is the key to achieve market power (Alstyne et al., 2016). Network effects are 
enhanced by technologies such as app development that can increase efficiency and help 
networks expand. Firms that manage to build larger networks than its competitors are able to 
offer greater value to its customers, which attracts more customers, which yields greater value 
for customers, which attracts more customers, and so on. This creates a feedback loop that 
produces monopolies according to Alstyne et al (2016).  
 
Internet is an infrastructure that facilitates electronic communication and depends on different 
technologies to function. Markets that leverage electronic communication to perform primary 
functions like (1) matching buyer and seller and (2) facilitate a transaction, are called Internet 
markets (Bakos, 1998). This is a broad definition and would not be sufficient to determine 
market power of a specific firm (Baker, 2007). However, this study is mapping out a risk-




Emerging Internet markets have created many new business opportunities and altered the 
environment in which firms operate (Lumpkin & Dess, 2004; Porter, 2001). Porter (2001) 
claims that the biggest impact of Internet has been allowing reconfiguration of existing 
industries due to more efficient communication and lower costs of doing business over the 
net.  
 
Rifkin (2014) depicts the lower cost of doing business over Internet as the zero marginal cost 
phenomenon. Internet reduces variable cost and tilt cost structure to fixed cost (Porter, 2001; 
Rifkin, 2014). The explanation is that digital products and services are stored and distributed 
over the Internet through selling one e-book over the Internet has close to the same cost as 
selling thousands of the same book because the publisher does not have to make physical 
copies of the book. Firms operating over the Internet selling digital products and services has 
a large fix cost but close to zero marginal distribution cost.  
 
As more and more goods and services edge towards digitalization and zero marginal cost so 
does the price that consumers pay (Rifkin, 2014). Startups today can launch goods and 
services to millions with just a credit card thanks to hosting services such as Amazon’s EC2 
(Anderson, 2009). Rifkin (2014) goes as far as to say that eventually this will create a 
paradigm shift away from capitalism.  
 
The velocity at which the Internet environment is changing is high, requiring frequent 
adjustment to the business model of Internet firms (Wirtz et al., 2010). A firm needs to stay 
innovative, or at a minimum, keep up with competition to survive. Firm innovation can be 
defined as a firm’s ability to create new value propositions through its business model. 
 
A business model captures the whole aspect of value creation of a firm, from what sources it 
uses for production, how it transforms sources into products and services, how it is delivered 
to the customer, and how revenue is generated from it. Thus, firm innovation encompasses 
both what value they give to customers and the process in which they achieve that 
(Schumpeter, 1938). The success if Internet firms is therefore not only dependent on the 
creation of customer value through their product or service but also on innovation in the form 
of process learning and capability creation (Liao et al., 2009). Beyond the descriptive power, 
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it has been argued that firms can compete through their business models and that it can 
explain heterogeneity in firm performance. (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
 
To sum it all up, low capital requirements for tapping into Internet markets creates 
opportunities for startups but also threats as a result of low entry barriers.   
 
Economics of Internet Firms 
Internet firms are processing of information as oppose to processing resources which takes us 
from textbook economics of diminishing returns to increasing returns (Arthur, 1996). 
Increasing returns are the tendency for that firms that get ahead to get further ahead and that 
firms that loses advantages are left further behind. Increasing returns are mechanisms that can 
exist within markets, firms, and industries and can entail a product, a firm or a technology. 
The presence of increasing returns makes businesses behave differently.  
 
There are three underlying factors that promotes an increasing returns environment according 
to Arthur (1996). Firstly, high-tech products are complicated to design and so R&D costs are 
relatively large compared to variable costs, and so large fixed cost are one influencing factor. 
Secondly, high-tech products need to be compatible with a network of users and so a product 
can approach a standard as it gains prevalence. Thirdly, these products are often difficult to 
use, which creates a lock-in effect. With increasing returns, a winner-take-all environment 
may also be present (Eisenmann, 2006). Therefore, firms can gain advantages by acquiring 
users early on before competitors emerge which in turn, promotes substantial spending on 
marketing.   
 
The development in cloud computing in recent time has fundamentally changed the way 
information technologies are developed, deployed, scaled, updated, and paid for (Marston et 
al., 2011). For the sake of this paper, I will not go in to technical details of cloud computing 
but stick to the business perspective of it. Cloud computing dramatically reduce cost of entry 
for firms that seeks to do business that requires high levels of computer power. This is 
because it eliminates the upfront by outsourcing the computing power to a cloud service 
provider as oppose to invest into inhouse computer power (servers) and bandwidth (internet 
speed). In turn, outsourcing of computer power also allows businesses to enter the market 
more quickly. The cloud is a flexible infrastructure that can be used for an infinite number of 
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businesses purposes. The flexibility and elimination of upfront cost that comes with cloud 
computing lowers It barriers for innovation as seen in the case of what-used-to-be startup 
Youtube and Facebook for instance. Another important implication of cloud computing is 
scaling. It makes it easier for businesses to scale their services in response to demand. One of 
the main purposes of cloud computing is the ability scale resources up and down dynamically 
without manual interaction. Furthermore, as computer hardware advances it becomes more 
affordable for computer power, reducing the cost of scaling, and thus reducing variable costs 
for businesses who operate in the cloud. These features have led to new classes of 
applications such as interactive mobile applications.  
 
One type which run on a cloud service is application-as-a-service (SaaS). Google Apps, 
Facebook, and Gmail are examples of SaaS, which is the most known type of application that 
run off of a cloud service. Cloud service providers that delivers infrastructure that makes SaaS 
possible are called Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) and consist of known tech moguls such 
as Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft. Important to note is that SaaS and IaaS should not be 
confused with what is later introduced as platforms when I talk about two-sided markets. 
 
Creating a new business involves considerable uncertainty due to not yet established work 
roles, lack of relationship with suppliers and buyers, base of influence, endorsement, and 
legitimacy (Chang, 2004). Furthermore, lack of resources to withstand sustain losses makes 
them more vulnerable. Such uncertainty makes investors hesitant to invest. To compensate for 
the uncertainty, startups tries to gain legitimacy. One way of achieving this is to team up with 
venture capitalists (VC). Studies show that VC funding has a significant explanatory power 
on IPO rates among startups.  
 
2.2 Two-sided Market Theory 
In 2003 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole published a theory which say that most markets 
with network externalities are two-sided (2003). A network externality refers to the utility a 
user derive from participating in a particular network (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In the 
literature, network externalities mostly refers to one specific externality, the utility derived 
from how many other users that participate on the network (McIntyre & Chintakananda, 




A business can operate such a two-sided market through a platform/technology. In order to 
succeed, firms that operate platforms in these markets needs to get users on both sides on 
board. Thus, constructing their business model to take advantage of network externalities on 
both sides while making money overall is crucial for survival (Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Two-
sided and multi-sided markets are the same thing except from how many groups of customers 
are connected to the market. Some literature also uses the phrase multi-sided networks which 
is the same concept.  
 
The most common definition of a two-sided market is characterized by two factors (Rysman, 
2009). (1) There are two sets of agents who interact through an intermediary or platform, and 
(2) Decisions made by one set of the agents affects the other set of agents. The first 
characteristic can be buyers on one side and sellers on the other side. The second 
characteristic corresponds to network externalities, the action of buyers needs to affect the 
sellers and vice versa. 
 
The two characteristics for a two-sided market can be applied to almost any market (Rysman, 
2009). A grocery store that buys products from producers and sells them to a customer can be 
said to fit in this definition because the price paid on inventory affects the price to customers 
and the more customers the store has the more attractive it is for producers. This is not 
problematic according to Rysman. How important the two-sided characteristic of a market is 
to determine an outcome is what makes two-market theory relevant or not. To clarify, we will 
use two art galleries. One gallery sells copies of famous paintings and the second gallery sells 
one-of-a-kind pieces from local artists. The gallery that sells copies have access to 
theoretically unlimited number of copies, so the producer of the paintings has little impact on 
the gallery’s customers. The success of this gallery is not significantly dependent on the 
producer. The second gallery that sells unique paintings from local artist however, depends 
significantly on the performance of the local artists in order to have success with is customers. 
Hence, how attractive the paintings are and how many local artists there are in the area is 
crucial to the customer-side of this market.  
 
A more narrow definition restricts two or multi-sided market to apply only when there is 
direct interaction between the agents on both sides like pricing decision (Hagiua & Wright, 
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2015). This means that if the firm makes the decision on prices, it is not considered a two-
sided market. This paper will not make this distinction and stick with the former definition 
that requires a significant network effect. 
 
To sum up, the relevance of two-sided market theory is determined by how strong the 
network effect is between agents. Network effects is a unique theory in itself but is so central 
in two-sided markets theory that it can be difficult to tell them apart. However, there is some 
differences. 
 
What sets the two apart is that the two-sided market literature puts more emphasis on the 
action of market intermediaries in terms of pricing choices (2009). In a one-sided market, 
pricing is a function of elasticity of demand and marginal cost, while in a two-sided market 
with strong network effects, the pricing will also be affected by the elasticity of the response 
on the other side of the market. The video game market is commonly used to illustrate this.  
Buyers of a video game console is interested in how many games that are compatible with the 
console, thus they care how many developers who makes games to the particular console. 
Thus, it is important for the creator of the console to incentivize developers to make games 
compatible with their console. Pricing choices becomes important in order to incentivize the 
developers so that the console becomes attractive among gamers. The same thing goes the 
other way around, the demand for buying the console affects the demand for developing 
games by developers. So the pricing in the driver side and the passenger side of the market 
depends on a joint set of demand elasticity marginal cost on each side (Rochet & Tirole, 
2003). 
 
A low price on one side of the market attracts elastic customer on that side, which allows for 
higher price or an increased demand on the other side of the market. This growth effect is 
very attractive to firms and often leads to prices below marginal cost on one side of the 
market in order to increase price or increase demand on the other side (Rysman, 2009). 
Combined with the zero marginal cost phenomenon of many Internet firms (Rifkin, 2014), 
this can allow for no charge or even negative prices on one side. Social media platforms are 
examples where one side of the market, the users, enjoys no charge for using the service, 
subsidized by advertisers on the other side. In an operating system market like Windows the 
amount of applications available for Windows attracts customers to buy their products. To 
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maximize the supply of applications, Microsoft offers free support and no licensing charge to 
developers. Thus, price can be said to be negative because Microsoft spends money to assist 
developers for free. 
 
Dynamic pricing makes sense in two-sided markets with network effects (Rysman, 2009). 
Penetration pricing in the beginning of the product life cycle helps a startup build a user base 
that can attract customers on the other side.   
 
Whether a group of agents tends to stick with one firm’s platform or use multiple platforms 
has important implication for choice of strategy (Armstrong, 2006). Market characteristics 
where agents choose to only use one platform is referred to as single-homing, and multi-
homing is when agents use several platforms. These two characteristics can yield three 
combinations of outcome; (1) both groups single-homes, (2) one group single-homes and the 
other multi-homes, and (3) both groups multi-home. The second combination, where one 
group is single-homing and the other group multi-homing, can have important implications 
for market power and pricing. If group 1 is loyal to the platform and group 2 wants to reach 
group 1, they have no choice but to go with the platform of group 1’s choosing. In other 
words, the firm has monopoly power. 
 
Monopoly over access to a single-homing group can be leveraged to high prices on the multi-
homing side (2006). However, when rivalry is present, the firm still needs to compete for the 
single-homers customers against competing firms. High profits from the multi-homing side 
will then be offset by low or even zero prices on the single-homing side. 
 
Despite that the utility of consumers is maximized when everyone uses the same platform due 
to positive network externalities, multiple large networks coexists in many of these markets 
(Ambrus & Argenziano, 2009). This holds both in the presence of a monopolist who own 
multiple networks and in markets with strictly competing providers. This means that a single 
large network operating alone in a market is rare according to Ambrus and Argenziano. 
Furthermore, one market structure seems to be particular common (2009). The structure 
involves two competing platforms where one is cheaper and larger on one side of the market 
while the competing platform is cheaper and larger on the other side of the market. In 
connection with having monopoly over access to one side which was mentioned in the 
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previous paragraph, the two competing platforms profit from each side of the market and 
subsidize low prices to the other side.   
 
Openness is an important strategic element to two-sided markets (Rysman, 2009) but is only 
discussed on other industries than Internet firms. A firm using a two-sided market model can 
to some extent choose how compatible their products or service is with competing platforms. 
For example, some store credit cards might only work in that store, or purchases in other store 
might not be eligible for credits for. We will discuss the relevance of openness strategy in the 
discussion part to see if it can be relevant to Internet firms risk-profile.   
 
Architecture 
The architecture of the design of a two-sided platform determines the participation between 
the agent groups and therefore also the rules, such as pricing terms, rights and obligations 
(Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008). While the literature on two-sided markets has focused mostly 
on pricing, Bakos and Katsamakas observes that the design plays a key strategic role for 
intermediaries as well. Network effects across the sides of a market is in part constructed by 
investment by the intermediary, and so firms needs to decide on capital allocation to 
technologies that creates value for the participants on each side of the market. As an example, 
they highlight the allocation decision on how much search engine firm Google should spend 
technology that increase value for advertisers and how much to increase value for Web users. 
The network effects that results from a platform design are endogenous because they are 
determined by the investment strategy of the firm who operates the platform and are called 
network benefits.       
 
2.3 First Chicago Method 
First Chicago Method (FCM) is a discounted cash flow (DCF) approach which incorporates 
several plausible outcome scenarios (Smith et al., 2011). The scenarios can be good, 
moderate, bad or anything in between. The goal of using multiple scenarios is to mitigate the 





Instead of limiting the analysis to one optimistic scenario, the FCM uses multiple probability-
weighted scenarios to more reliably estimate the expected future cash flows. The expected 
cash flows are then discounted by a more realistic cost of capital, rather than the high rates 
used in the VC method. If the scenarios are properly weighted, the correct discount rate to be 
used should equal the actual cost of capital. One benefit of using probability-weighted 
scenarios is that it requires the analyst to think of the range of possible outcomes than can 
occur in uncertain markets, rather than just a best-case scenario.  
 
In FCM a firm’s value in each of the scenarios consist of two parts, present value (PV) of the 
terminal value (TV) and the future cash flows (CF). The present value of each scenario is then 




Where “i” represents scenario index and “h” is the number of years into the future forecasted 
(usually expected exit/sale for venture capitalists). To fully explain the First Chicago Method 
the parts of DCF needs to be introduced next. 
 
The main idea behind DCF valuation is that the value of assets is derived from its ability to 
generate cash flows in the future. This makes sense as ownership over an asset entails the 
claim to future cash flows, and so if one is to sell his/her claim, it is only fair to claim the 
value of those cash flows (Damodaran, 2007). There are several types of DCF methods and 
many of them adjust for risk differently (Smith et al., 2011). FCM adjust for risk through 
average cost of capital (WACC) while the most commonly used DCF used in introductory 
finance textbooks uses a risk adjusted discount rate (RADR) which combines WACC with a 
discount rate that compensate for the risky cashflows (2011). According to Hodder and Riggs 
(1985) the way FCM adjust for risk is better than RADR. With RADR the risk adjusted 
discount factor grows geometrically with time. Startups for instance can have higher risk in 
the beginning and lower risk in the future. The time value of money still applies though and 




The WACC of startups can be difficult to estimate and usually consist of mostly a high cost of 
equity (Abrams, 2010). The cost of equity can be viewed in terms of what venture capitalists 
requires in return. Abrams suggest using a discount factor of 25%, which is consistent with 
empirical evidence on the success rate of VC funded startups.    
 
The relative importance of terminal value assumed in a firm’s total value differs between 
industries but is especially high for a typical high-tech firm (Lee & Louis, 2003). According 
to Lee and Louis, 125% of a typical high-tech firm’s total value is derived from the terminal 
value for a forecasting period of 8 years. This means that majority of the value is derived from 
cash flows after 8 years. Reasoning on established economic theory, it would be safe to say 
that this is not less true for the average high-tech startup. As seen below (cash flows in first 
bracket and terminal value in second bracket), in addition to discounting the terminal value 
with the WACC, an assumption about the stable growth rate (g) that the firms go into after the 




The transition out of the forecasted period represents that the firm’s high-growth phase is over 
and enters a steady state, thus we can use a constant growth rate. What could also be said is 
that it is assuming that the firm continue operations indefinitely and has no maturity date like 
cash flows derived from bonds and projects. DCF requires a significant amount of forecasting 
which can incur errors in practical use, however, most sophisticated valuation methods rely 
on forecasting and is nothing unique to this approach (Damodaran, 2005).   
	
Uncertainty 
How uncertainty is accounted for in the FCM is covered above but in bits and pieces. For 
convenience, this will be briefly summarized. FCM treats uncertainty in two ways. First the 
cash flows are discounted based on WACC. Abrams (2010) suggest using a discount factor 
based on average success rate of VC investments, which is 25%. Secondly, the scenarios 
probability-weighted. The weight is something the analyst would have to determine based on 
how he/she perceive the probability of each scenario.  
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2.4 Real Option Valuation 
Real options are basically an extension of financial options to real assets as opposed to 
financial assets (Trigeorgis, 1996). Therefore, option theory on a more general basis will be 
addressed as well. The employment of ROV can be justified by the assumption that there is a 
possibility to abandon an investment if turns out to be bad, hence there is an option structure 
to the investment (Damodaran, 2005; Douglas, 2007; MacMillian, 2004). It provides a 
sophisticated framework for dealing with market risk, however, it does not deal with firm-
specific risk which can be a substantial part of the risk profile of high-tech firms (Douglas, 
2007; MacMillian, 2004). 
 
Fundamentals 
Financial options give the owner (of the options) the right, but not the obligation, to buy or 
sell a financial asset for a certain price. The financial asset could for example be a stock, bond 
or other financial instruments and is referred to as the underlying asset. If the option gives the 
owner the right to buy the underlying asset, it is called a call option. An option with the right 
to sell is called a put option. When the owner of an option decides to take advantage of the 
right to buy or sell the underlying asset, it is referred to being exercised. When in time the 
owner can exercise the option depends on the type of contract. European options only allow 
the owner to exercise at a pre-specified date, while American options allow the owner to 
exercise at any point in time within a pre-specified date. The time between now and the 
expiration date is called time to maturity. Also, because financial options are the right, but not 
the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset, the owner is free to withstand from 
exercising the option and let it expire on the pre-specified date. This makes sense because the 
price of the underlying asset could be less than the agreed upon price in the option contract 
(exercise price), making the underlying asset cheaper to buy directly from the open market. 
The option itself has a price as well, which means that it is profitable for the owner to exercise 
the option if, and only if, the value of the underlying asset is more than the exercise price plus 
the price of the option. In a state where it is profitable for an owner to exercise is called “in 
the money”, in a state where it is unprofitable is called “out of the money”. When the value of 
the underlying asset is equal to the exercise price plus option price, it is “at the money”.  
 
After the origin of financial options by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) the 
application of option pricing extended on to real assets by Myers (1977). His argument was 
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that many corporate assets, growth opportunities in particular, could be viewed as call 
options. Real options can be translated into the right, but not an obligation, to take some 
action in the future (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). They are “options” because they are rights but 
not obligations and they are “real” because they are embedded in a productive investment. 
Productive investment usually referrers to investments in real assets but in real option 
literature also extended to investment in companies (equity stake). This is justified by saying 
that the liability of owning equity in a firm is limited to what is paid for the shares. Someone 
who owns a company or parts of it can never lose more than the initial investment unless 
he/she decides to invest more. This can be illustrated as a payoff structure where the potential 
loss is limited to the initial investment (option price) as seen in figure 1 below.  
 
 
Figure 1: Call Option (buy) Payoff 
 
The value of real options, like financial options, is an increasing function of risk. In finance 
risk is measured as volatility (Hull, 2012), and so the more volatile the value of the 
underlying asset is the more valuable the real option is. This means that risk is treated as a 
positive factor in ROV. The more the value of the underlying asset swings up and/or down the 
higher value is assigned to the real option. The reason for this is that in real option theory, 
higher market uncertainty can provide valuable growth opportunities for firms (McIntyre & 
Chintakananda, 2013). 
 
Volatility can be modeled with a historic, based on historic volatility, or a subjective approach 
(Copeland & Antikarov, 2003). Whatever approach is used, it is important to understand that 
it is only a part of the risk that can be modeled. Risk is composed of three types of 
uncertainties; the known-knowns, the known-unknowns, and the unknown-unknowns 
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(Gustavsson, 2011). One cannot model for unknown-unknowns, precisely because they are 
unexpected (Penman, 2013). As oppose to known-unknowns which are events that are 
recognized as possible but the timing and magnitude are unknown. 
 
Real options was initially coined to single investment project (Myers, 1977) and have since 
extended to aggregated company valuation by considering the firm as a portfolio of options 
(Kemper, 2009).  
 
Growth Options 
In software (Kemper, 2009) and other markets with network effect (McIntyre & 
Chintakananda, 2013), ROV approach allow the valuation to capture the value of customer 
networks as growth options through a call option (Kemper, 2009). The option is the claim to a 
software firm’s cash flows which is exercised if the customer network reaches a critical mass. 
Growth option has become a popular approach to value firms with products influenced by 
network effects (McIntyre & Chintakananda, 2013). The value of a growth option consist of 
the current assets plus opportunities for future growth (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Future 
growth opportunities for a firm can be considered to be a growth option because a firm can 
use its current capabilities and resources to gain valuable access to future opportunities 
(McIntyre & Chintakananda, 2013).   
 
With growth options the investment decision rule is extended so that a product should be 
released if the net present value plus growth option value equals or exceeds zero (NPV + G ≥ 
0) (2013). Thus, even though the NPV of an investment or a product is negative, it could still 
make sense to invest if the growth option value (G) is large enough. Types of opportunities 
that are structured as a growth option is depicted as “stage-setting investments that allows 
firms to take on value-added follow-on activities or investments in the future”, such as 
technological patents, brand power, R&D knowledge, and licenses according to McIntyre & 
Chintakananda. 
 
Releasing products early, ahead of competition, yields substantial market uncertainty and 
thus, high growth option value (2013). Lin and Kulatilaka (2007) have explained how firms 
can achieve high growth opportunities from early release of products through real option 
theory.  Less studies have been done on potential benefits of delaying the release of a product 
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(McIntyre & Chintakananda, 2013). Materialization of the growth option value can be 
achieved when a firm pursue the growth opportunities while containing the downside risk.       
 
Deferral Options 
Market uncertainty also make the option to defer taking action valuable. Firms can defer from 
releasing a product or making an investment, and at the same time hold on to the right to 
commit later in the future (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). This allows firms to pursue high risk 
opportunities and postpone the commitment (exercise the option) when the market is less 
uncertain (McGrath, 1999). At high levels of uncertainty, firms will have difficulties with 
allocating optimal amount of resources to production, planning, and marketing. Which in 
turn, might result in large opportunity costs (McIntyre & Chintakananda, 2013). Hence, when 
firms commit to irreversible investments in uncertain markets they terminate the deferral 
option and lose the opportunity to make the investment at a later point in time when the 
markets become more favorable.  
 
When a firm defer their commitment to an irreversible investment to sometime in the future 
when uncertainty is resolved, it is protecting itself from any downside risk and minimizes 
opportunity costs (2013). Also, a firm may save costs associated with developing the market 
if it defers the investment to after early movers. To sum up, the deferral option value of a 
given product is the value of deferring an early product release, being able to release the 
product in the future, and avoiding opportunity costs with respect to irreversible investment in 
market development (McGrath, 1999; McIntyre & Chintakananda, 2013). The more uncertain 
the market is, the higher the value of a deferral option (D). In other words, a firm should 
commit to a product release when net present value minus value of deferral option is greater 
or equal to zero (NPV – D ≥ 0). 
 
Network Effects 
The presence of network effects increases the value of a growth option (G) by a factor (⍺) 
according to McIntyre & Chintakananda (2013). It acts as a multiplier (⍺G), resulting in a 
lower threshold (NPV + ⍺G ≥ 0) for committing to irreversible investment. This shift is the 
result of three factors from network effects, (1) it enables firms to use their initial userbase 
across multiple products, existing and future, in order to create a portfolio of growth options. 
(2) Firms that are ahead of competition in industries with high levels of network effect tend to 
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enjoy preemptive advantages which allow them to maintain growth option. And (3) firms may 
be able to steer the direction of future opportunities when they have a loyal customer base by 
selling new products, creating switching costs, and gaining the ability to charge higher prices. 
The main takeaway from the three factors is that high levels of network effects creates a 
winner-take-all environment which enhances growth options. 
 
A winner-take-all environment incentivize firms to over-invest as an early mover in order to 
get ahead (2013). However, the cost of developing a network decreases over time and so late 
movers have advantages as well. Late movers can wait with product release until just before 
early movers get too far ahead, that way they can save costs and still be in the competition.  
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PART III -  DISCUSSION 
 
In this section I will discuss the four sub-question in order to answer our main research 
question “how can two-sided markets theory help analyze options embedded in unprofitable 
internet startups?”. The numbering 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 corresponds to the four sub-questions 
and for convenience the questions will be restated in each section of the discussion as well. In 
the last section (3.5) we will analyze options embedded in an internet startup through two-
markets theory to demonstrate its usefulness. 
 
3.1 Relevance of two-sided markets  
The sub-question discussed in this section is “is two-sided markets theory relevant to the 
majority of internet startups or just a few?”. 
 
I believe two-sided markets theory can be applied to a wider range of internet firms with 
network externalities than what is covered by the current literature. Recall that the biggest 
difference between network effect and two-sided markets theory is the emphasis on the action 
of market intermediaries in terms of pricing choices (Rysman, 2009). By extending the theory 
to encompass a wider group of internet firms, we are able to analyze how more firms can 
improve monetization on network externalities through pricing action and choice of market.  
 
Studies on two-sided markets have primarily focused on platforms that bring together buyers 
and sellers. On platforms like this, decisions made by agents on one side of the market affects 
the agents on the other side and vice versa. More contemporary studies have applied the 
theory on social networks as well (Haucap & Heimeshoff, 2014). For social network 
platforms however, the network externality is more of a one-way street, not so much vice 
versa.  
 
In the case of Facebook for instance, I would argue that users are indifferent whether 
Facebook has a thousand advertisers, or just five hundred. Empirical studies have shown that 
many internet users even tries to avoid advertisement through ad blockers (Vratonjic et al., 
2013). Advertisers on the other hand, cares a great deal about how many users there are on the 
platform because it is relevant to how many people they can reach. Thus, advertisers are more 
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like a necessary evil that subsidizes free services. This means that we are already seeing an 
expansion of the definition from positive network externalities on both sides to positive on 
one side and negative on the other. 
 
As pointed out by Rysman (2009), practically every business can be classified as a two-sided 
market if one look at the two criteria alone. Suppliers or labor could be classified as the other 
side of the market. However, it is the importance of the characteristics of a two-sided market 
that determines the relevance of the theory. This is the focus-point in this discussion.  
 
Business models that subsidize users are becoming increasingly popular among internet 
startups in general (Bauer & Latzer, 2016; Evans, 2013), not just social networks. The 
subsidies have to come from somewhere. Thus, criteria (1) there are two sets of agents who 
interact through an intermediary or platform and (2) decisions made by one set of the agents 
affects the other set of agents, is of importance for internet startups in order to become 
profitable while they offer services for free. If the startup is already constructed as a two-sided 
market, the theory can provide analysis on how to improve monetization on the side that 
generate revenue. If the startup is not constructed as a two-sided market, the theory can help 
analyze agent groups that potentially can be connected with the existing user group in order to 
monetization. Hence, two-sided markets theory can prove useful as a tool to analyze the 
monetization options embedded in a larger part of the population of internet startups than just 
social networks.  
 
I would counter an argument saying that this is not unique to internet firms, by arguing that 
internet firms have more possibilities than none-internet firms. Internet firms are not limited 
by geography, demographics and other restrictions. Also, it is easier for internet firms to 
achieve prices sufficient enough to subsidize the other side of the market because they have 
lower costs. This can be backed up by Rifkin’s (2014) work on the zero marginal cost 
phenomenon. Furthermore, it makes sense from a perspective of Alstyne’s (2016) new rules 
of strategy that claims that network effects is the key to achieve market power on the internet 
because it is a demand-side driven economies of scale environment.  
 
To summarize and come to a conclusion on this discussion; the importance of the 
characteristics of a two-sided market determines the relevance of two-sided markets theory. 
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We are already seeing the theory extending to some groups of internet firms. Network effects 
is the key to market power, and so subsidizing customers makes a lot of sense in order to 
grow. It is more feasible for an internet firm to subsidize customers due to zero marginal cost. 
And lastly, possibilities of connecting agent groups into a two-sided market on the internet are 
greater than off the internet. Based on Rysman’s (2009) threshold for the relevance of two-
sided markets, the theory is relevant to internet based startups. 
 
3.2 Two-sided Markets in a Valuation setting 
The sub-question discussed in this section is “how relevant is two-sided markets theory for 
valuation purposes?”. This discussion will be approached from two angles, I will first show 
how it can be used alongside FCM and ROV. For ROV it is only price and volatility that 
needs to be calculated as a unique part related to our two-sided markets approach, and so the 
rest of ROV analysis will not be covered.  
 
Two-sided markets theory can be useful to construct the scenarios in FCM. Recall that the 
purpose of this paper is to look at options that firms can actively pursue to achieve 
profitability, and so basing the scenarios on growth in users is not relevant. The theory tells us 
that the firm can either (1) add an agent group with network externalities with the existing 
agent groups, (2) it can replace an existing agent group if the platform is two-sided already, 
(3) it can redesign its platform, and (4) it can alter pricing. An analysis of the four choices will 
reveal what is feasible. Advertisers can always be connected to a platform that runs on a 
smartphone or a webpage, and so (1) will therefore always be feasible if not added already. 
There is a possibility that more than one agent group can be connected to the market, these are 
called multi-sided markets. Facebook is an example of something that has evolved into a 
multi-sided market with users, advertisers, and developers of apps that run on Facebook 
(Haucap & Heimeshoff, 2014).  If the platform is already a two-sided market but (2), an agent 
group which would incur less costs or have a stronger purchasing power is identified, it might 
make sense to reconfigure the market to target this agent group instead in some cases. The 
startup could also (4) redesign its platform in a way that in a way that increases monetization 
through improved network effects. 
Now, let’s say that an analysis from a two-sided markets perspective reveal option (1), the 
startup could add an agent group to its platform which would improve monetization 
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significantly but incur higher risk. In the last discussion part, I will demonstrate such an 
example with a startup called Robinhood, who offers commission-free trading of stocks. For 
the sake of the argument, assume that the added agent group would double the revenue due to 
the price that the startup is able to charge this group. However, in order to connect the new 
agent group to the market the startup needs a certification to operate in this market. The 
expected likelihood that the startup is able to obtain such a certificate and succeed with 
acquiring a given number of customers in this market is 40%. If this was the best option an 
analyst could identify, this would have served as the best and only scenario in the popular 
venture capital method (VCM) used by many practitioners (Smith et al., 2011), but for the 
FCM it can be one of several if more scenarios are identified. Also, it will be weighted by its 
probability as oppose to exaggerating the discount rate in order to compensate for the 
uncertainty (2011).  
 
When the analysis is finished, it reveals that option (1) yields the best-case scenario and is 
mutually exclusive. The mutually exclusive factor is just to simplify our case, adding an agent 
group to the market in practical does not necessary hinder the firm of doing other things as 
well. Continuing, the analysis also revealed that a combination of (2) and (3) is feasible if 
option (1) is not exercised but would yield less revenue with lower risk and a 70% probability 
of success. Hence, we have two scenarios for the FCM, one is option (1) and the second is a 
combination of option (2) and (3). In addition, the option to abandon/exit will of course also 
be present, and thus we have our third scenario. Now we have three scenarios, two of which 
are based on a two-sided markets analysis, that can be used in FCM. An analyst would then 
need to estimate the cash flows of each scenarios. This is not necessary as trivial as it was in 
this case where we said that it would double the revenue. Next, we construct some numbers 
from the scenarios so that we can move on to the FCM.  
 
The same scenarios from the two-sided market analysis can be used to determine the inputs in 
a subjective approach to ROV. In the first stage we need to decide how to use the scenarios to 
calculate price and volatility of the underlying asset. FCM or a DCF method without a risk 
adjusted discount rate can be used. In the next section I will do a FCM valuation on an 




3.3 Two-Sided Markets Analysis on a Startup 
This section is for demonstrating the first discussion on an actual internet startup and is part 
of answering the first sub-question. A challenge with valuating a real startup is access to 
information and is the reason a case-study method was not used in this paper. As mentioned 
in the research design, I will need to make assumptions on most numbers regarding the 
startup and draw information about their business from their website. The numbers will be 
artificial but the information on their business model and how they make money will be 
accurate, which is the critical part for the purpose of demonstrating a two-sided markets 
analysis. 
 
The startup is called Robinhood who’s value proposition is to make investing available for 
everyone through commission-free trading of stocks and exchange-traded funds ("How 
Robinhood Makes Money," 2018). They subsidize the commission by earning interest accrual 
on customers’ uninvested cash balance. Clearly the customers who enjoy commission-free 
trading can be considered as one side of the market. According to the website, there are two 
ways Robinhood makes money. First, the firm “earns revenue by collecting interest on the 
cash and securities in Robinhood accounts, much like a bank collects interest on cash 
deposits”. From this statement it is reasonable to believe that Robinhood turns to banks in 
order to earn interest on the uninvested cash balance. This makes sense because there is a low 
risk involved with keeping cash in a bank account. Secondly, they charge $6 per month for 
doubling customers buying power and access to trade after hours. The access to trading after 
hours part is difficult to understand and will be left out of the analysis. The double buying 
power is the same as margin trading, meaning that traders can borrow twice their balance for 
trading stocks for $6 per month.    
 
From a two-sided markets perspective, the Robinhood platform is a multi-sided market. We 
have trading customers on one side, banks on another side, and finally margin traders on the 
third side of the market. We start by looking at the network effects in play. Trading customers 
do not care how many banks or margin traders Robinhood have, or how much interest they 
receive on deposits. But there is a network effect in the way that banks and margin traders 
subsidize commission-free stock trading and the traders provide capital for banks and margin 
traders. Banks do not care how many trading customers or margin traders Robinhood have. A 
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simplified summary is that Robinhood monetize on banks and margin traders with the help of 
uninvested cash balances from regular customers.  
 
For the numbers we will assume that Robinhood has 5 million trading customers, 100.000 
margin traders and 4 banks associated with their platform. Furthermore, we assume that the 
average uninvested cash balance held by traders is $200, interest rate on deposits with banks 
are all 0.5% annually, and the margin traders borrows $100 million in total for stock trading. 
This means that the current revenue from banks is $4.5 million (0.005 x (5 million x 200) -
100 million) and for margin traders $7.2 million (6 x 12 x 100.000). Total revenue is therefore 
$11.7 million. Cost are important and especially the break-even threshold for Robinhood. 
However, making assumptions on costs in numbers will gets us no further than if we just 
focus on maximizing revenues. An increase in revenues in the analysis is an increase in 
revenue in real life. But costs can be misleading because it can result in positive profits in the 
analysis but negative profits in reality and vice versa.  
 
We will start with option (1) from the previous discussion section. Add an agent group to the 
market. Robinhood have trading customers with uninvested cash balances on one side, so 
potential agent groups to connect would be someone who is in need of capital. With revenue 
improvement in mind, we are looking for someone who is willing to pay more for capital than 
banks. Auto and consumer loans could be a good fit that would yield somewhere around 5% 
and 15% interest. For simplicity we only go with auto loans with 5% interest rate. The 
tradeoff is higher risk and pay-back period, thus part of the uninvested cash from customers 
would need to be held in banks to ensure liquidity. If we assume that the average pay-back of 
these loans are 90%. Then a 20% margin of the total uninvested cash balances needs to be 
allocated to a bank account and for margin traders. Of $1 billion in total uninvested cash, a 
maximum of $800 million (200 x 5mill x 0.8) can be allocated to auto loans. Once again, we 
simplify and say that the defaults take place immediately so the revenue is (800 x 0.9 x 0.05) 
which yields $36 million in revenue. Revenue from banks is now $0.5 million and the total 
revenue is $43.7 million (36 + 0.5 + 7.2). Acquiring auto loan customers is not as easy as 
depositing cash into a bank account so the probability of lending out all 800 million is 




Option (2) is to replace an agent group. The trading customers cannot be replaced because 
they provide the capital but the other agent groups can. Banks cannot be replaced completely 
either because they need to maintain liquidity. Robinhood is able to earn 4.5 cents per dollar 
occupied to auto loans while margin traders yield far less than 1 cent per dollar it occupies. It 
could make sense to eliminate margin trading and free up the 100 million to auto loans. 
However, margin traders attract regular traders to the platform and so they should not be 
eliminated.  
 
Option (3) is to redesign the platform to enhance network effects and/or increase 
monetization. While this option is highly relevant it would require extensive insight into how 
the platform works. I’ll give one example however on how this can be relevant. Let’s say that 
Robinhood could replace margin traders with forex traders in option (2). This would make 
sense if forex brokerage is more profitable than margin trading on stocks. Some of the needed 
infrastructure for the trading platform is already there but the firm would need to add on a 
new interface for forex trading. While this option might be feasible, it is unclear what revenue 
it can bring in without doing research on the forex brokerage industry. Thus, we will not 
consider this option as a scenario 
 
Two scenarios have been identified with the two-sided markets analysis, but we will only 
consider the option to add auto loans to the market. What has not been covered is user growth.  
The first, and best, scenario would increase the total annual revenue to $43.7 million. The 
second scenario would be no changes and total annual revenue of $11.7 million. With 
knowledge of costs, we can derive the cash flows. In the best-case scenario, costs of adding 
automobile loan to the platform need to be included in the first cash flow. For the second 
scenario, no extraordinary cost will occur the first year.  
 
What is becoming clear by now is that it is difficult to proceed with translating the two-sided 
market analysis into cash flows without too much guessing when we do not have insights into 
the costs of the firm. This is a challenge that appraisers without access to financial statements 
will face with most internet startups (Damodaran, 2009). For internal usage or cases where the 
analyst has full access to financial information the analysis would perhaps be more fruitful.  
We continue our endeavor to translate our analysis into usable inputs for FCM and ROV 
analysis to get the full picture on how far we can get with limited information.  
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Next, growth rates remain for the two cases we have constructed. The two-sided markets 
analysis does not tell us any specific. However, it is reasonable to assume that revenue growth 
would be higher in the first years in the best-case scenario because the firm would be tapping 
into a new market. For the second case where everything is unchanged, a growth rate based 
on previous years would be a reasonable assumption. Here, we run into the same challenge as 
with the costs when the analyst has limited information. Issues with estimating costs and 
growth rates when financial information is scarce is not unique to a two-sided markets 
analysis but there are other solutions to do a valuation on startups in such situation. Turning to 
representative firms to make assumption is one approach (Damodaran, 2009). A classical 
approach to ROV where price and volatility of the firm is estimated using a replicating 
portfolio would also circumvent the costs and growth rate issue completely (Borison, 2005).   
 
A worst-case scenario should also be represented but is not constructed by the two-sided 
markets analysis. The firm could face stagnating or negative growth rates in terms of users. 
Having information on the financial history of the firm will probably not help with estimating 
negative growth rates because it is less likely that a high-growth startup has experienced this 
yet.      
 
To sum up the analysis, I was able to construct plausible scenarios including revenues and 
synergies based on the two-sided markets analysis. For an analyst with limited access to 
information it is impossible to reliably estimate costs and growth rates in order to derive the 
final cash flows.  
 
3.4 Advantages and Limitations   
The sub-question discussed in this section is “what are the advantages and limitations of a 
two-sided markets approach compared to real option valuation?”. To evaluate pros and cons 
of using two-sided markets approach I will compare it with using ROV because it is an 
established method. 
 
It is impossible to reliably estimate costs and growth rates when information is scarce, as we 
saw in the previous discussion. Hence, the method is less useful for analysts with limited 




Comparing the method to a ROV approach, one of the strongest argument for using ROV is 
that it captures the value of managerial flexibility (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; MacMillian, 
2004). The option to wait with budgeting decisions until the arrival of information that reveals 
whether the firm should expand, divest or abandon. Exogenous information variables such as 
demand, prices or costs would trigger budgeting decisions for example. I would argue that 
some of this flexibility is less relevant to internet firms’ growth options. Recall from the 
Theory chapter how Amazon offers “on demand” cloud services. Internet firms do not have to 
invest in infrastructure to pursue growth options to the same degree as firms that operate in 
more traditional markets. With cloud services the capacity to grow is already there and it 
allows internet firms to pay per usage. If a growth option entail that the userbase of an internet 
firm will grow with millions of users in a short period of time, they do not need to invest in 
more powerful servers and more bandwidth. This capacity is already there with the cloud 
service provider. And if it is not, the cloud provider would have to invest, not the client 
(internet firms). Hence, the investment decision regarding production capacity is outsourced 
to cloud service providers. However, it is plausible that internet firms might have to hire more 
people to handle customer support and other things related to expansion. The bottom line is 
that the investment curve as a function of demand (success or failure) is significantly more 
linear for internet firms, rather than incremental which is the case for firms that are running 
their own IT infrastructure. Thus, the stage-setting investment characteristic of a growth 
option (McIntyre & Chintakananda, 2013) is missing in many internet firms.  
 
A two-sided markets framework is demand-side driven and thus limit to the options explored 
to market related opportunities. Real Option Valuation on the other hand capture the value of 
successful business development opportunities which can be either technology or market 
driven (Yeo & Qiu, 2003). I would argue that option (3) redesigning the platform from the 
discussion in 3.2, capture some of the technology driven opportunities but to a limited extent 
only. It does not capture technology driver opportunities such as releasing completely new 
products or services. As seen with big internet firms such as Google and Amazon, creating 
ecosystems with several products allows to further utilize network effects and is not 
uncommon. Google leveraged the revenue from the search engine to release many other 
products such as Gmail, Google Docs, and acquire technologies such as YouTube, Android 
and so on. The question becomes, how relevant is new product releasement to startups with 
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little to no revenue. A line needs to be drawn between realistic and hypothetical managerial 
flexibility when using a subjective approach such as a two-sided markets framework. Unless 
the startup has sufficient revenue or funding, it is hard to justify that the new product 
releasement component of managerial flexibility is plausible enough to have any significant 
value.  
 
Using two-sided markets as a framework for ROV requires us to take a subjective approach as 
mentioned earlier. This can be problematic if comparable firms exist that can be used to 
construct a replicating portfolio according to Borison (2005). There are many publicly traded 
internet firms but one should be careful to conclude that a classical approach with a 
replicating portfolio should be used rather than a subjective approach. Assuming that the price 
and volatility of an internet startup can be replicated by a portfolio of publicly traded internet 
firms contradicts the assumption that network effects creates a winner-take-all environment 
argued by Alstyne et al. (2016).  Especially if the replicating firms are operating in the same 
market as the startup.   
 
Having looked at the advantages and limitations of two-sided markets analysis in a valuation 
setting, it is time to move on to a conclusion and suggest future research.   
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PART IV - CONCLUSION 
4.1 Conclusion 
The objective of thesis has been to study how two-sided markets theory can help analyze 
internet startups in a valuation setting in order to solve the profit dilemma. To accomplish this 
in a systematic way the following research question was developed:  
 
How can two-sided markets theory be incorporated to valuation of internet 
startups?  
 
The answer to this question was divided into four sub-questions in such way that the 
conclusion would consist of (1) generalizability, (2) connection between the two theories, 
two-sided markets and valuation, (3) practicality of connecting the two theories, and (4) 
advantages and limitations of doing so.  
 
The conclusion is that a two-sided markets theory can be incorporated as an analytical 
framework to construct probability-weighted scenarios based on market opportunities. This is 
true for most internet startups but only when sufficient financial information is available. 
When financial information is limited the incorporation of two-sided markets theory can make 
estimation significantly unreliable. The advantages of incorporating a two-sided markets 
framework is that it allows the analyst to focus on revenue opportunities beyond user growth. 
The disadvantage is that it makes a ROV biased by forcing the subjective approach.  
 
The strength of this conclusion must be interpreted in light of limitations of this study. To my 
best knowledge, this is the first attempt to use the two-sided markets theory for valuation 
purposes. Therefore, there is no foundation in the literature on this particular usage. Hopefully 
this paper can inspire others and more studies on incorporating two-sided markets theory to 





4.2 Future Research 
As seen in this paper, limited access to financial information on a firm hinders the 
incorporation of two-sided markets framework of yielding a comprehensive valuation. This 
paper was able to show how useful a two-sided markets approach can be in identifying and a 
range of options an internet startup has and rank them by revenue. However, it was not 
possible to derive realistic cash flows due to insufficient information about costs. This calls 
for a case study with sufficient data to show the usefulness of this approach in terms of 
deriving the cash flows and assess growth rates to be used when information is available.  
 
Further, this paper has focused on startups which obviously limits the results to apply to such 
firms. Future research could attempt to apply and adapt the two-sided markets framework to 
publicly traded internet firms. The benefit of pursuing public firms is that financial statements 
are available.  
 
Last, McIntyre and Chintakananda (2013) created a growth option model which incorporates 
the strength of network effects to increase the growth option value in a product release setting. 
It would be interesting to see future research attempt to create a similar model with a two-
sided markets approach and not a product release. It might be that the only way to do this is to 
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